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                                                                        “Heaven is high, and the Emperor is far away”  
                                                                          (tian gao huang di yuan)   
                                                                                                                (A Chinese Proverb) 
 
Introduction 
Historical evidence shows that many Southeast Asian countries inherited from their colonial 
masters systems of government that tended to be centralised.  The colonial empires 
depended upon the superiority of firepower to survive.  Of necessity they had to be tightly 
knit and controllable from the centre.  After independence, these countries still preferred to 
remain centralised.  Centralisation was the logical consequence of the desire for natural 
unity and nation-building. Centralisation of power led to the imposition of rules and 
regulations even to the local government. Centralisation remains the framework of 
governance.   
 
However, with the rise in population, declining service standards and quality of life, 
changing political dynamics and global economic volatility, these have precipitated a 
movement for more public participation and better governance. In other words, there is an 
impetus for change and a need for a paradigm shift in the administration of the nation.  It 
calls for a re-look into the traditional rule-bound and bureaucratic oriented process of 
governance.  But moving towards a system that is more flexible and open can only be 
possible with national transformation and reform of an unprecedented scale.  The impact of 
such a transformation will have implications on the relationship between levels of 
governments, issues of centralisation-decentralisation and good governance. Obviously, any 
set-back to central-state-local governments’ relations will affect the central government’s 
ability to steer the process of economic growth and transformation of the nation.  In this 
context, the paper probes into the phenomenon of decentralisation which remains the 
framework of governance and emerging re-centralisation.  Amidst, this paradox of political 
and administrative transformation, local government stands as the link-pin to assess 
changes in the dynamics of relations between levels of government and its sustainability. 
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The culture and evolution of history of a nation can significantly influence its political system 
and the way a country manages its government. However, external factors may also affect 
and change the way the country relates and deals with its society, economics and politics.   
 
Domestic issues and external influences have often provided the impetus for transformation 
and reforms in administration and governance. The country’s rate of economic growth, its 
natural resources, human assets, globalisation and foreign trade will combine and 
determine the extent of transformation and shift in intergovernmental relations. It is hoped 
that by embracing these reforms the country will be able to improve its domestic 
performance (service delivery, good governance) and enhance its global competitiveness.  In 
essence, reforms within the country will arguably challenge the central government as it 
critically steers the nation to achieve the objectives of transformation.  Central government 
will not only play the vital role of formulating and implementing but it has to adjust itself to 
changing circumstances which also involves assessing its relationship with its sub-national 
governments.  Decentralisation thereby evolves as politics and economics spark changes in 
many nations and central governments re-look the dynamics of their relationship with state 
and local governments. This issue will be discussed by reviewing inter-governmental 
relations in selected ASEAN countries and China.  
 
China’s Call 
China continues till this day to be a country that displays decentralisation of administration 
while adhering to a policy of political centralisation.  The notion of political reform is not 
new in China’s history although it perceives the term ‘political structural reform’ as more 
appropriate. Since the 1970s, China had embarked on a process of structural reforms under 
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping’s politics of modernization, but it has emphasised its 
differing opinion of the western concept of political reforms leading to change in political 
parties and hence the leadership.  China’s Communist Party leadership has never accepted 
this notion of rotation of party rule (it considered this as Western style democracy). Hence, 
its process of reforms have been structural and based on the concept of socialist 
modernization (Yiu-chung Wong, 2010). Evidently, it marked the importance of ‘the Party, 
the army and the people....to work with one mind and one heart, enhance political stability 
and unity.....and make China a modern, powerful socialist country....’(Zhonggong zhongyang 
wenxian yanjiushi (ed.) 1987, p. 5.). 
 
When Mao Zedong was still alive the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governed China and 
exercised tight political control over the provincial and local governments as well. With a 
one party rule, centralisation was at its peak and it was possible for Mao to give and take 
powers from local government when he saw fit.  It was only after the death of Mao in 1976 
and with the advent of Deng into the economic scene that China moved gradually toward a 
market-based economy and with some semblance of relaxation of economic reins from the 
central government (Goh, 5 March, 1996; Swift, 2004). The drive towards economic growth 
started with the ‘special economic zones’ in the industrial cities of eastern China which 
brought forth economic success and a new breed of entrepreneurs (Zhou, 2010). Following 
the process of economic reform and restructuring of state owned enterprises, there was a 
movement away from central control of businesses to employee ownership of enterprises 
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especially in the provincial and local levels thus sowing the seeds of decentralisation (Swift, 
2004). This process of decentralisation was an indirect result of China’s rapid economic 
growth and its transformation from an insular economy to a highly open one. It realised that 
to encourage further economic growth more authority had to be delegated to the lower 
levels to carry out policies quickly and efficiently with less control from the central 
government.  At the same time, these lower level governments, especially the provincial 
governments being less inclined to central control are able to improvise and negotiate 
massive business deals and economic projects.  The idea was to encourage growth by 
delegating more authority to the lower levels and this was China’s progression into 
administrative decentralisation.  China still adheres to a one party system and political 
centralisation, but rapid economic development meant China had little alternative but to 
decentralise.  
 
As a consequence, since China began its economic expansion that led to its astronomical 
growth, it is the local governments that have played an instrumental role in this (Zhou, 
2010).  It is emphasised that decentralisation was not formally planned in China but was an 
unplanned outcome of its economic policies.  By the late 1970s China started promoting 
free enterprise, embraced globalisation and loosened central control (Zhou, 2010). Foreign 
investment and economic growth was fast expanding in many of these industrialised 
municipalities and provinces and when China became a member of the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001 it had to be officially more open in carrying out trade activities.  
Ultimately, it is the local government that will need to fulfil this task of executing economic 
policies at the local level to foster greater growth while simultaneously managing local 
affairs. With the rising importance of local government, and the central government relying 
on local government to carry out its economic policies at the lower levels, the relationship 
between local and central has to take on a more meaningful system of power distribution.   
 
Notwithstanding, everyone is constantly reminded that (a)China is centralised politically and 
(b)the CCP will not allow itself to lose grip on power throughout the country.  As long as this 
status quo is not challenged in any way, and local government adheres to the politics and 
policies of the CCP, local government is given ample autonomy to act as a relatively 
independent power to promote the progress of economic growth at its locality (UNESCAP).  
With the rapidly increasing rate of economic growth and development in China, local 
governments in China will have a greater share over administration and economic 
management, enhancing the concept of administrative decentralisation while maintaining 




Table 1: GDP (%) in Selected Countries (2006 – 2010) 
 
Year China Cambodia Lao PDR Malaysia Vietnam 
2006* 11.6 10.8 8.1 5.8 8.2 
2007* 13.0 10.2 7.9 6.3 8.5 
2008* 9.0 5.2 7.5 4.6 6.1 
2009^ 9.1 -2.7 7.5 -1.7 5.3 
2010^ 10.3 6.0 7.7 7.2 6.8 
Sources: *World Bank Indicators, 2009, ^UNCTAD. 
 
Decentralisation Orientation: Country Perspective 
For many countries neighbouring China, for instance Malaysia, Cambodia, Lao PDR and 
Vietnam, their governments are also experiencing political, economic and social 
transformation although in different dimensions. In most instances, their lower tier 
governments, specifically the local governments have often been tasked to make good on 
the promises of the central government to the citizens.  Obviously, central-local government 
relations may be strained within the parameters of decentralisation, and in this process, re-
centralisation may emerge due to divergence in political beliefs and behaviour between the 
different tiers of government. 
 
Malaysia 
For instance, in Malaysia, the changes that have taken place in local government to render it 
more responsive to begin with was administrative but later became politicised after the 
2008 general elections in the country. [(This election was held on 8 March, 2008 and yielded 
one of the worst results for the ruling coalition party which also did not win the necessary 
two-thirds majority in the Malaysian Parliament.  This was required in order to pass 
amendments to the Malaysian Constitution. Five states were also won by the opposition 
party). (Wikipedia/Malaysian general elections)]. Malaysian local government too is 
managed in a central-state-local relationship, where local government is a state matter 
under the national Constitution (Federal Constitution, 2011).  However, Section 95A (1) of 
the Constitution states that, “there shall be a National Council for Local Government” 
(NCLG) and 95A (5) emphasises that, “it shall be the duty of the NCLG to formulate from 
time to time.....a national policy for the promotion, development and control of local 
government throughout the Federation and for the administration of any laws relating 
thereto....” (Federal Constitution, 2011).  Coupled with the fact that Section 75 of the 
Federal Constitution states that if any state law is inconsistent with the federal law, the 
federal law shall prevail, clearly demonstrates the nature of relationship that Malaysian 
local government has with the central government.  
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Since the 2008 elections, some states are now controlled by a political party different from 
the party in control of the central government.  This situation has compelled the central 
government to re-examine its relations with the state and local governments.  Indeed, the 
2008 general elections have contributed to current sentiments in inter-governmental 
relations and raised concerns about local autonomy and decentralisation in Malaysia. 
Previously with central and state governments belonging to the same political party, some 
elements of decentralisation especially administrative decentralisation was present (Phang, 
2011).  The federal government allowed the state governments to deal with issues of its 
own local government, for instance, appointment of its Council President, approval of 
funding for development projects, and disbursement of financial grants to the local 
authorities from the federal government. However, current developments in federal-state 
matters indicate sentiment towards re-centralisation.  An issue that is testing the relations 
between central-state-local is the attempt by some state governments to carry out local 
elections. With local government elections being abolished in the mid 1970s, local 
councillors are now appointed by the chief minister of each state government for a period 
of 1-3 years (Malaysia, Local Government Act, 1976). The local authorities in the two states 
of Selangor and Penang are under the control of a political party which is different from the 
federal government.  These two states are trying to re-introduce local government 
elections. However, the federal government has disagreed and is reverting to Section 95A of 
the federal constitution as the basis of its right to refuse to change the law and allow local 
elections. 
 
In Malaysia local government depends on the support of higher levels of governments to 
fulfil its obligations to the public and to be seen to be carrying out their services and 
functions.  This requires some form of decentralisation and autonomy to the lower tier 
governments to perform their activities to the standard required.  There should not be a 
dilution of local autonomy because of differences in party affiliation between central and 
state governments.  The code of power-sharing should be adhered to and as far as possible 
the process of devolution should remain to allow local government to deliver from a 
position of strength rather than from weakness.  Decentralisation should not be 
compromised which can significantly influence the performance of local government and 
affect economic growth.  Malaysian local government needs the support of the central 
government and some powers to carry out its functions yet it must not be seen to be 
outperforming the central government.  Accelerating economic growth and productivity are 
necessary for the Malaysian government to achieve its economic transformation objectives 
and the central government realises that this is only achievable with the cooperation of 
lower tier governments regardless of their political affiliation. In Malaysia the central 
government faces a crucial dilemma in that continuous decentralisation may lead to the 
erosion of its powers vis-a-vis the lower tier governments. Current political events provide 
little avenue for local government to be transformed to a totally decentralised tier; or hope 
of more autonomy.  Re-centralisation rather than decentralisation appears to be the trend 
in Malaysia and it is apparent that local government’s sustainability depends more on 
politics rather than economics. 
 
While the traditional relevance and position of local government in Malaysia remains, 
federal government’s approach to it requires re-orientation in line with the needs for 
increased decentralisation rather than re-centralisation.  Perhaps, this is one of the 
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intriguing paradoxes of globalization generating a new interest in relationship between 
society and governments whereby when society flourishes; there is a weakening of state 
institutions at the national levels (Stren, 2001). 
 
Lao PDR 
Elements of decentralization in practice have been observed in some other ASEAN nations.  
In Lao PDR, a country with a small population of around 6.5 million compared to China, 1.3 
billion and Malaysia, 28.7 million (the-world-factbook, July 2011), started minor reforms in 
1980 for socio-economic transformation which were an attempt at decentralizing the 
autonomy of the central leadership.  In 1986 some structural and economic reforms were 
initiated where administrative decentralisation occurred but within the scope of controls on 
wages, production targets and private activities (St. John, 2006).  Other reforms were also 
carried out that influenced the role of the state notably in revenue raising and civil service 
administration which became less inclined towards party politics pressures (Reyes, 1998).  
The Asian financial crisis did affect to a certain extent the Lao economy which inadvertently 
influenced the state’s efforts in decentralization as the central government began to grapple 
with increasing financial and human resource constraints at both the central and local 
levels.  To prevent further deterioration of the Lao economy, the central government began 
re-centralising most major functions and finances and the central government brought in 
interventionist policies and single party rule.  Today, with improving macroeconomic 
conditions, (Table 1 shows, Lao PDR’s GDP averaging 7.7%), the process of decentralisation 
and transferring of responsibilities to local government via a new budget law is again carried 
out.  The Lao experience suggests that there are limits to decentralisation when the nation’s 
economy is weakening and centralisation is legitimized to prevent bankruptcy. 
 
Cambodia 
Cambodia, with a population of 14.7 million (the-world-factbook, July 2011) has a four-tier 
government comprising the Central Government, Province and Municipality, District and 












Source: Ministry of Interior, Cambodia, 2007.
Authority flows downwards where each level of government is responsible for the tier of 
government below it.  The issue of finance clearly demonstrates this process of control.  The 
ability of each level of government to carry out its functions depends upo
allocation provided it by that level of government directly above it.  For ins
expenditures of the Communes and 
government to collect revenue and subsequently allocated to the
government provides an equalisation grant 
insufficient; requiring the lower tiers of government to ensure efficient revenue collection.  
In 2001, the Commune/Sangkat Council Election was re
reintroduced in 2002 under the Commune Administration Law.  The return of local election 
reignited the decentralisation process, and the local communities were able to decide on 
their own development activities and even sourced f
collecting local taxes.  Local government in Cambodia is a legal entity with respect to 
development and financial matters and can even obtain grants and loans by internation
donor and financial agencies (Ministry of Interio
 
In reality the central government still maintains a semblance of control over local 
government because it still provides the bulk of revenue to local government and retains 
the right to tax. Even for implementation of development projects, t
come from the central government. 
professional and skilled manpower, underdeveloped land allocation and registration system 
plus poor collection of property tax.
with the national plans of the central government (Phang, et al, 200
 
In Cambodia’s case, elements of decentralisation can be observed with
de-concentration and sharing of administrative authority 
perform functions and activities relevant to their own communities.  
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 1: Levels of Government, Cambodia 
 
Sangkats are confined to the ability of the provincial 
to the provincial government which is mostly 
-enacted and local elections were 
or their own revenue including 
r, Cambodia). 
he bulk of resources 
This is due mostly to local government’s lack of 
 At the same time, local development plans must concur 
9).  
 respect to
where lower tier governments can 
The country as a whole 
 
n the financial 
tance, the 





is still developing and there is little choice but for the lower tier governments to depend 
upon the central government for support.  (As Table 1 shows, Cambodia’s GDP was growing 
by double digits until 2008 when it declined to 5.2% and -2.7% in 2009). In the same 
manner, the central government too needs to work closely with the lower tier government 
in an effort to implement development projects for the betterment of the nation as a 
whole.  Thus with Cambodia, the observation is that central-local government relations is 
interdependent as the concern is the country’s growth and economic wealth; 
decentralisation becomes a by-product of this process. 
 
Vietnam 
The position in Vietnam is such that its local governments are considered de-concentrated 
agents of the central government and do not possess constitutionally mandated resources, 
responsibilities and legal status.  As a unitary state with a centrally planned economy its 
central-local government relations reflect China’s position where decentralisation is 
expressed in administrative terms.  With a population of close to 90.5 million (the-world-
factbook, July 2011), it has three different administrative levels; Provincial and Centrally 
administered cities, District and Communes as shown in Table 2. 
 






District • Urban district 
• Cities belong to provinces 
• Provincial township 
• Rural district 
Communal • Commune 
• Ward 
• District township 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Vietnam, (2007). 
The primary responsibilities of local government in Vietnam are to provide education, health 
care and welfare services as well as to undertake development projects such as road and 
public building construction, irrigation works and maintenance.  It is responsible for 





As a centrally planned communist state, the Communist Party’s branches are spread out to 
the local government units.  Each level of local government has a People’s Council, People’s 
committee and branches of the Communist Party (CP) where laws and policies of the central 
government are filtered down to be implemented by these central agencies.  Central 
government control is paramount whereby a higher level administrative unit has the 
authority to overrule the actions and decisions of the administrative unit below it.  
According to the “Law on State Budget”, each local administrative unit has an independent 
budget and it can collect its own revenues.  Generally, this is insufficient and central 
government still provides the main source of finance and the distribution ratio among 
various local government units.  The quantum and distribution is decided by the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam.   
 
Since the end of the Vietnam War and the late 1990’s efforts in economic reforms (doi moi), 
Vietnam has experienced rapid economic growth and development.  With continuing 
economic growth it is inevitable that outlying government units have to be involved and this 
has spurred progress in central-local relations.  Sub-national governments especially the 
Provinces are increasingly given more administrative powers to carry out their functions and 
less subject to expenditure controls.  Although there is delegation of responsibilities to local 
governments, however, Vietnam remains a one-party state with a centrally driven system.  
Similarly as in China’s situation, Vietnam’s central government’s option is to allow some 
elements of local autonomy and to work closely with its local units to expand the nation’s 
services and infrastructure.  Vietnam’s progress in intergovernmental relations and 
decentralisation may be uneven, but since the Vietnam War, the country has moved 
forward economically. 
 
Observation and Conclusion 
Despite some of these nations sharing similar experiences in their route to decentralisation, 
there are some differences in the outcomes. Comparatively, Malaysia’s decentralisation 
process in the form of devolution can be deemed to have a long tradition with regular local 
elections.  Subsequently, local elections were abolished and the privatisation of many of its 
functions and continual reliance on federal government for financial aids has circumvented 
decentralisation and diluted the powers of the lower tier governments.  The 2008 general 
elections exposed the fragility of inter-governmental relations in Malaysia and changed the 
status-quo of central-state relations.  Politics and political factors thwarted the progress of 
decentralisation in Malaysia which reverted to re-centralisation.  This is a significant 
outcome considering that the other nations discussed thus far are effectively building a 
framework for decentralisation although none of them have a formal decentralisation 
policy.  Although considered less developed than Malaysia, Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia 
have some form of local elections; even China with a long history of central control has 
allowed elections of its village officials. 
 
Today, Asia has been identified as a region where the next phase of economic growth and 
trade activities will occur.  These countries have all experienced increasing productivity 
especially China followed closely by Vietnam and in the process have undertaken public 
sector reforms. Due to the region’s rapid growth, it is inevitable that these countries have 
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begun to ‘open-up’ and economic transformation necessitates cooperation of all levels of 
government and even handing more powers to sub-national governments as experienced by  
China.  Indeed, Vietnam and Cambodia appear to be following China’s pattern of 
transformation where decentralisation in the form of de-concentration has been 
established. On the other hand, Lao PDR, due to the country’s weak economy and political 
instability, decentralisation was clearly not an option and the central government had no 
choice but to assume powers again. 
 
Overall, Malaysia appears to be the only country whose decentralisation process is based on 
a constitutional basis with a set of laws and clearly defines its sub-national governments as 
devolved units of administration.  For the rest, de-concentration seems to be the framework 
for operating decentralisation.  In Malaysia due to political consequences there is 
continuous erosion of local government autonomy that signals the emergence of more 
central control. Meanwhile, China and Vietnam with a centrally controlled and planned 
system appears to be moving towards greater autonomy for their sub-national 
governments.  Cambodia with a constitutional monarchy is progressing towards the early 
stages of decentralisation, albeit modestly due to its recent emergence from a period of civil 
war. 
 
Observation of China and Vietnam indicates that rapid economic growth appears to be the 
driving force for decentralisation enabling local government to have more autonomy.  This 
progress in decentralisation takes the form of administrative decentralisation rather than 
political decentralisation.  China and Vietnam are also countries of great size compared to 
Lao PDR, Cambodia and Malaysia which makes central control difficult.  As economic growth 
increases and the country opens up progressively, some degree of decentralisation becomes 
inevitable.  In China’s situation decentralisation was essentially a by-product of economic 
transformation (Smoke, 2003) and similarly in Vietnam where economic prosperity has 
loosened central control over its sub-national government.   
 
The countries of Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam have experienced periods of political 
instability and wars which have influenced the present type of regime and government.  In 
Vietnam, the Vietnam War devastated Vietnam’s economy; Cambodia experienced 
extremes with the Khmer Rouge and a civil war and Lao PDR faced internal security threat 
from resistance groups.  These countries are presently experimenting with free market 
economies and foreign trade with China, which is the world’s second largest economy 
today.  China’s economic progress and development will be closely monitored by the ASEAN 





A persistent trend among these nations is the tendency for central governments to control 
their sub-national governments (political centralisation), whether in the case of a 
democracy and multi-party system like Malaysia or single party system in China.  The power 
of control lies in central government’s grip on resources, lucrative financial sources and 
human capital.  The consolation for sub-national governments is that rapid economic 
growth and increasing wealth of the nation supports better central-local government 
relations and administrative decentralisation.  Putting aside politics, so long as there is 
economic prosperity and need to open-up the country, there is hope that local government 
will be sustained for the continued development and growth of the nation.  This will also be 
in line with the need for good governance which emphasises strengthening local 
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